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The Death Sentence in
Pennsylvania-1978-1990: A Preliminary
Analysis of the Effects of Statutory and
Nonstatutory Factors
John F. Karns*
Lee S. Weinberg**
I.

Introduction

In Furman v. Georgia,1 the United States Supreme Court ruled
that states permitting capital punishment must institute procedures
to protect against the "wanton" and "freakish

'2

imposition of the

death penalty, and must provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not."' Four years after the Court's decision in Furman, a
plurality of the Court in Gregg v. Georgia' provided "[a] n important
additional safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice" 5 by requiring
the Georgia Supreme Court to determine whether any given death
sentence is disproportionate compared to those sentences imposed in

similar cases.
In the aftermath of Gregg, Pennsylvania enacted a death penalty statute in 1978 which expressly mandates that proportionality

reviews be conducted by its supreme court in all death penalty
cases. 6 In addition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has created a
system for the collection of data to assist it in making its proportion* J.D., University of Pittsburgh; Ph.D. Sociology, University of Pittsburgh; Member of
Pennsylvania Bar; Associate Professor of Public and International Affairs, University of
Pittsburgh.
** Ph.D., Political Science, University of Pittsburgh; J.D., University of Pittsburgh;
Member of Pennsylvania Bar; Associate Professor of Public and International Affairs and Political Science, University of Pittsburgh.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
2. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
3. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
4. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
5. Id. at 198. However, in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984), the Justices ruled that
state supreme court comparative proportionality review was not constitutionally required under
all circumstances. Id. at 44-45.
6. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h)(1) (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1990).
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ality reviews. Despite the existence of this data collection system, no
comprehensive analysis of these data has been published by the court
or the administrative agency responsible for its collection and storage, nor have the data been made available to researchers for independent analysis.
The United States Supreme Court rejected a claim in McCleskey v. Kemp' that racial discrimination had infected the administration of Georgia's capital punishment. McCleskey, a black man, had
been convicted of the capital murder of a white police officer and
was sentenced to death. 8 While challenging the legality of his death
sentence, he introduced testimony and evidence about a complex statistical study completed by Professor David C. Baldus and his colleagues that suggested that the death penalty in Georgia was applied
disproportionately in homicide cases that involved white victims and,
to a lesser extent, in cases that involved black defendants. 9 The
Court, by a vote of five to four, ruled that absent a showing of invidious discrimination in each specific case, statistical evidence suggesting that racial discrimination generally influenced the administration of capital punishment did not establish a violation of a
capital defendant's rights on either equal protection or cruel and unusual punishment grounds.' 0 McCleskey thus rejected the critically
important contention that the formal changes made in post-Furman
capital punishment legislation had failed to correct the very defect in
the administration of the death penalty that had concerned the Justices in Furman.
The four dissenting Justices in McCleskey remained convinced,
however, that post-Furman statutory reforms had failed to eradicate
serious problems of discrimination and arbitrariness in the administration of the death penalty." The validity of this dissent finds partial support in the Pennsylvania data examined in this study.
This paper presents an overview of these data and offers a preliminary analysis of the impact of a series of factors on the question
of which defendants convicted of first degree murder in Pennsylvania
are sentenced to death and which are sentenced to life imprisonment.
7.

481 U.S. 279 (1987).

8. Id. at 283-85.
9.

Id. at 291-391. See D.

BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION

§§ 8.43-8.433 (Supp. 1987); Acker, Social Sciences and the Criminal Law: Capital Punishment by the Numbers - An Analysis of McCleskey v. Kemp, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 454 (1987)
(reviewing McCleskey and the data on which was based).
10. 481 U.S. at 298-99.
11. Id. at 320-45 (Brennan and Marshall, J.J., dissenting); Id. at 354-66 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 366-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The goal of the research reported herein is to examine the data for
the relative effects of statutorily mandated versus extra-statutory
factors in determining which convicted defendants are sentenced to
death and which are sentenced to life imprisonment. The statutorily
mandated factors examined in the study are the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances specified in the Pennsylvania death penalty
statute. Beyond those factors, however, our research examines the
effects of race and sex of the offender and victim, the means of guilt
determination, and the degree of urbanization of the offender's
county of residence upon the probability of receiving a death sentence. Part II provides the legal framework within which Pennsylvania implements capital punishment. Part III describes the nature of
the data to be examined. Part IV presents an analysis of the data,
and Part V draws empirical and legal conclusions based on the
analysis.
II.

Capital Punishment in Pennsylvania

Under current Pennsylvania law, the question of whether or not
to impose the death penalty arises only following a conviction for
murder in the first degree. 12 First degree murder is defined as a
criminal homicide "committed by an intentional killing." 18 Felony
murder is classified as second degree murder, 14 and any other murder is classified as third degree murder. 15 Thus, the death penalty
sentencing statute1 6 is triggered only by a conviction for murder in
the first degree. When the defendant has requested a jury trial, the
statute provides for a separate sentencing hearing to be conducted
before the same jury that rendered the guilty verdict in order to "determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life
imprisonment."1 " At the sentencing hearing, the jury must sentence
the defendant to death if it finds at least one of the sixteen statutorily prescribed aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, or if the jury finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. 18 In all other cases the jury
must sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. 19
12.

13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(1) (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1990).
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(a) (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1990).
Id. § 2502(b).
Id. § 2502(c).

42 PA. CONS. STAT.
Id. § 9711(a)(1).
Id. § 9711(c)(1)(iv).

Id.

ANN.

§ 9711 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1990).

95

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SUMMER 1991

Pennsylvania law provides for automatic review by the state supreme court in every case in which the death sentence is imposed. 20
The sentencing statute requires the supreme court to affirm the
death sentence except when it finds that the sentence resulted from
arbitrary factors, that the evidence presented by the prosecution was
insufficient to prove an aggravating circumstance, or that imposition
of the death penalty "is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the circumstances of the
21
crime and the character and record of the defendant."
Since the enactment of the statute on September 13, 1978, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also been obligated to conduct a
proportionality review in each death penalty case coming before it;
such a review has, in fact, been recited by the court in every death
penalty case. In the leading case on proportionality review in Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Frey,2 the court stated that
[w]hile the Sentencing Code does not define 'similar cases' nor
set forth any specific procedures for conducting this proportionality review, this Court conducts an independent evaluation of
all cases of murder of the first degree convictions which were
prosecuted or could have been prosecuted under the Act of September 13, 1978.1 8
As part of the statutorily mandated proportionality review in all
cases in which a death sentence has been imposed, the court must
compare the circumstances of the crime and the character and record of the defendant with all other "similar cases. '"24
"Similar cases," in turn, have been operationally defined by the
court as all first degree murder cases that "were prosecuted or could
have been prosecuted. 2 5 The court has interpreted the phrase
"could have been prosecuted," as requiring a comparison of each
death penalty case to all other cases resulting in convictions in which
the death penalty "could have been" imposed, but was not namely, all cases in which a conviction of first degree murder has
been obtained.
Professor David C. Baldus has praised the Pennsylvania proportionality review procedure as one "which appears to come closest to
the model envisioned" by the National Center for State Courts Pro20.

Id. § 9711(h)(1).

21. Id. § 9711(h)(3)(iii).
22. 504 Pa. 428, 475 A.2d 700 (1984).
23. Id. at 443, 475 A.2d at 707.
24. Id. (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h)(3)(iii)).
25. Id.
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ject on Comparative Proportionality Review in Death Sentence
Cases (NCAC). 26 Yet Baldus also criticizes the Pennsylvania plan
both for its "ad hoc, unprincipled decisions" 2 about how to use the
data that it collects and for failing to follow the NCSC recommendation that "the pool of cases for a proportionality review system
should contain, as a minimum, all cases in which the indictment included a death-eligible charge, and a homicide conviction was
'
obtained." 28
Although it might be legally sustainable at this point to compare the cases of those sentenced to die with those who were convicted of first degree murder but sentenced to life imprisonment, the
restrictive supreme court interpretation of "similar cases" excludes
an important class of relevant and potentially comparable criminal
defendants - those originally charged with murder for which the
death penalty might be imposed, but who for a variety of reasons
never were convicted of first degree murder. Consequently, critics of
the current Pennsylvania system might argue that a significant question still exists as to whether or not defendants sentenced to die have
been treated unfairly. To determine whether or not those sentenced
to die have been treated disproportionately severely, one would have
to compare each defendant's crime and his/her record and character
with all other defendants who could have been convicted of first degree murder, given the nature of the crime.
Specifically, the current Pennsylvania Supreme Court definition
of "similar cases" excludes all cases in which a plea bargain has
reduced the charge to something less than first degree murder. This
definition also excludes those cases in which the jury has convicted
the defendant of second or third degree murder or manslaughter,
even though first degree murder was one of the options presented to
the jury by the judge. Since all homicides in Pennsylvania are filed
under a general charge of criminal homicide, only at the close of the
trial does the judge inform the jury in his charge as to what possible
degrees of murder (or manslaughter) they are entitled to consider
under the law.
When the prosecution initially seeks the death penalty, the process is slightly different. In those situations, the jury must first be
26. D. BALDUS, G. WOODWORTH & C. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 290 (1990) (citing the NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS PROJECT ON COMPARATIVE PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW IN DEATH SENTENCE
CASES: 1982-1984) [hereinafter EQUAL JUSTICE].
27.
28.

See EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 290.
See id. at 283.
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"death qualified." 2 9 Prior to the recent change in the Pennsylvania

Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require the prosecution to notify
the defense of its intention to seek the death penalty and to "notify
the defendant in writing of any aggravating circumstances which the
Commonwealth intends to submit at the sentencing hearing

. .

at

or before the time of arraignment,"30 the defense typically discovered the prosecution's intent to seek the death penalty when the defendant's request for bail was turned down because the district attorney viewed the prosecution as a capital case.
The issue of whether the population of those convicted of murder in the first degree will ultimately be upheld as properly constituting the universe of "similar cases" intended by the sentencing statute
may still have to be litigated. Certainly a cogent argument may be
made that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's current approach does
not fulfill its statutory obligation to conduct proportionality review in
all cases in which the death penalty has been imposed. Our research
also questions the validity of proportionality reviews undertaken between 1978 and 1983 due to the lack of a systematic data collection
procedure for first degree murder convictions during that period. Definitive answers to the legal questions raised above will require research beyond that undertaken for this paper. However, this research
provides a starting point for that effort.
I1.

Pennsylvania Death Penalty Data

In Commonwealth v. Frey,81 an automatic death penalty appeal
involving the mandatory proportionality review, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court released in an Appendix a copy of the proportionality data collection instrument to be used thereafter entitled "Review
Form: Murder of The First Degree" (Review Form). Earlier the supreme court had issued an order dated December 6, 1983, which
required President Judges in each county to complete the Review
Form for every first degree murder conviction in their counties from
that day forward. That order also required that the same information be retroactively compiled for all such convictions obtained from
September 13, 1978, when the death penalty was 'einstated in Pennsylvania, up to 1984. From 1984 to the present, the data collected on
the Review Form have provided an empirical basis for conducting
29. See Commonwealth v. Edwards, 521 Pa. 134, 555 A,2d 818 (1989), holding that the
Pennsylvania Constitution "extends no greater rights to an accused in capital cases" regarding
death qualification of a jury than is required by the U.S. Constitution.
30. PA. R. CRIM. P. 352.
31. 504 Pa. 428, 475 A.2d 700 (1984).
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proportionality reviews. The Frey case incorporated the court order
of December 6, stating that President Judges shall provide the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC) with "information pertaining to each such conviction" 3 on an ongoing basis so that
the court will have the information needed to conduct the mandated
review of similar cases.
The court in Frey made no direct reference to its order of December 6, did not explicitly state how long this particular form had
been the basis for its data collection, and did not explain the basis on
which it had conducted proportionality reviews from 1978 to December of 1983. The data that we have obtained, however, have been at
least partially retroactively compiled back to 1978. While some data
collection had been done by the AOPC from 1978-1984, the decision
in Frey seems to have formalized that process and made it public.
Data have been collected by the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania courts and made available to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court for proportionality reviews since 1983. The authors have no
independent means to verify that the number of first degree convictions contained in the data set supplied is equal to the true number
of such convictions obtained in Pennsylvania either pre-Frey or postFrey. However, the data collection process undoubtedly became
more formalized and accurate in some counties after Frey.
Following Frey, however, in every case that results in a conviction for first-degree murder, each trial judge has a clear duty to
complete and forward to the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania
courts the official "Review Form: Murder of the First Degree." The
Review Form seeks data reflecting a broad array of variables related
to the nature of the offense, the defendant, circumstances of aggravation and mitigation, and the outcomes of the trial or guilty plea
recital. The form has been updated periodically to reflect changes in
the law, particularly with regard to aggravating circumstances.
Regardless of the debate over the proper universe of cases to be
examined in a proportionality review, the data provided by the President Judges in every county in Pennsylvania are the only data available to us, and presumably, to the court. Our analysis is restricted,
therefore, to those cases in which a conviction of murder in the first
degree has been obtained. Specifically, the population studied here
consists of all defendants convicted of first-degree murder under
Pennsylvania law, from 1978 to 1989, whether or not the prosecution
initially sought the death penalty. Specifically excluded are all cases
32.

Id. at 443, 475 A.2d at 707.
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during the same time period when defendants might have been convicted of first degree murder, but were either convicted of a lesser
crime or not charged with a homicide even though they might legally
have been so charged. The reasons for the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion to file or not to file general charges of homicide in specific
cases are beyond the bounds of this research. Furthermore, the absence of data on all cases in which convictions of first degree murder
were legally possible (as indicated by the presence of the first degree
option in the charge to the jury), but not rendered by the jury, complicates the task of interpreting both the legal and empirical significance of the findings reported in this paper.
The Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts has been
reluctant to make the collected data set resulting from this practice
available to social researchers. When asked to supply them, the Administrative Office furnishes a voluminous printout of the data with
no documentation other than a copy of the above-described Review
Form. The authors also received these data in this form. To overcome this limitation, the authors first carefully scanned the data
with an electronic scanner to create a machine-readable data file.
This process was repeated four times. Data elements in each position
were then compared for each scan. Those that showed agreement in
at least three of four scans were accepted as valid. When lesser
agreement was found, each data element was identified, manually
distinguished, and visually verified on the printout supplied by the
Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts. In this fashion, a
validated, machine-readable data file was created from the data
printout identified above.
Although the data were able to be validated by the process described above, they were still not able to be definitively mapped to
specific variables on the Report Form. The authors overcame this
limitation through intervention of defense counsel in a pending capital case. Following the issuance of a court order to make the data
available in a usable form to the authors who were serving as consultants to the defense team, the authors received an SPSS (Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences) System File from the AOPC. Variable and data mappings in the authors' constructed data file were
then compared with the official data set, and all points of indeterminacy were eliminated.

DEATH SENTENCE IN PENNSYLVANIA

IV.
A.

Research Findings
Overview of Attributes of Cases

During the period covered in this research, and pursuant to the
rulings of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court detailed above, the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC) collected
data on 1,174 cases. Of those prosecutions, 615 (52.4%) arose from
Philadelphia County alone. Cases from Allegheny County numbered
107 (9.1%). Together, these two counties accounted for more than
three of five of all cases examined. The victims of the 1,174 firstdegree murder convictions studied involved twice as many males
(64.6 %) as females (32.3 %). These victims were also predominately
white (48.0%), with slightly fewer blacks (42.4%) and very small
representations of Hispanics (4.3%), Asians (0.8%), and others
(0.2%). In 258 (22.0%) cases, the district attorney alleged that the
killing occurred during the commission of a felony, but this aggravating circumstance was held to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt in only 150 (12.7%) instances. The prosecution sought the
death penalty in 560 (47.7 %) of these cases, and of that number,
214 (18.2%) resulted in a sentence of death.
Males and young adults comprised the overwhelming majority
of the defendants (96.2%) in these 1,174 first-degree murder convictions. The defendant's racial composition was 635 (54.1 %) black,
464 (39.5%) white, 64 (5.5%) Hispanic, 7 (0.6%) Asian, and 4
(0.3 %) "other." In nearly two out of three cases, 735 (62.6%), the
defendant was tried alone. Of the remainder, 252 (21.5%) were
tried with one codefendant, 94 (8.0%) went to trial with two codefendants, and the balance had three or more defendants.
Pennsylvania law specifies sixteen "aggravating circumstances,"
at least one of which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt as a
precondition for the imposition of the death penalty."3 For data collection purposes, the AOPC has separated the statutorily defined aggravating circumstances into twenty-one data elements on the Report Form. These separate data components are referred to as
"aggravating circumstances" in the balance of this paper. Over the
twelve years studied herein, nearly half of these aggravating circumstances were alleged by the prosecution in just three or fewer actual
cases. These included cases in which the victim was a firefighter or
other public servant, held for ransom by the defendant(s), held as a
hostage, killed in a hijacking, an informant, a child under twelve
33.

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 971 1(c)(iii) & (d) (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1990).
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years of age, and cases in which the killing was drug related or in
which the defendant had other manslaughter convictions. In contrast, the prosecutor alleged the other eleven "aggravating circumstances" much more frequently. In 9 (0.8%) cases, the defendant
was already under a life sentence at the time of the murder; in 12
(1.0%) the victim was a peace officer; in 27 (2.2%) instances he or
she received payment for the killing; and in 27 (2.3 %) others he or
she paid another to perform the killing. Even more often, 42 (3.6%)
cases, the district attorney alleged that the victim was a witness
against the defendant in another case. In 45 (3.8%) instances the
defendant had been convicted of prior murders; in 77 (6.6%) prosecutions, the accused was presented as a state or federal convict at
the time of the killing; and homicide involving torture was claimed in
94 (8.0%) cases.
The three most frequently used "aggravating circumstances" included: the defendant's history of prior felony convictions in 125
(10.6%) cases; the creation of a substantial risk of harm to someone
other than the victim during the killing in 150 (12.8 %) prosecutions;
and the allegation that the murder was committed during the perpetration of another felony in 258 (22.0%) cases. Our analysis of "aggravating circumstances" focuses primarily upon those more commonly alleged and disregards those that are rarely raised.
B.

The Effects of Race

Prior research has shown that the most serious injustice inflicted
by the system of capital prosecution and sentencing in the preFurman period was a broadly pervasive, disproportionate imposition
of the death penalty on members of racial minorities. Gregg modifications were intended, in part, to eliminate this racial bias in the use
of the death penalty for murder. To determine if charges in Pennsylvania's death penalty statute achieved this goal in the post-Gregg
period, defendant's race was cross-tabulated against the sentence imposed across the 1,174 first-degree murder convictions studied
herein. The outcome of that analysis is set out below in Table 1.

DEATH SENTENCE IN PENNSYLVANIA

TABLE 1.
Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Sentencing Outcome and Defendant's Race
Defendant's Race
Sentencing
Disposition

White

Life

81.7%

Black

Hispanic

Asian

Other

85.7%

100.0%

960

0.0%

(81.8%)
214

II

80.6%

92.2%

Death

18.3%

19.4%

7.8%

14.3%

Column
Totals

N=464

N=635

N=64

N=7

Row
Totals

(18.2%)

N=4

1,174
(100.0%)

Clearly, in Pennsylvania in the post-Gregg period, very little association exists between racial identification and a death sentence after a conviction of first-degree murder. This absence of relationship,
on the whole, is reflected in a computed Cramer's V value of .07 for
this table. s" Before controls are imposed for aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the percentage of whites sentenced to death,
18.3 %, is not meaningfully different from the percentage of blacks
receiving the same sentence, 19.4%. Further, if all nonwhites are
collected into an aggregate "Minority" category, then the rate of
sentencing to death is virtually identical-18.3% (85 of 464) for
whites and 18.2% (129 of 710) for minorities. The only notable discrepancy in Table 1 above is the 7.8% rate of sentencing Hispanics
to death. However, the relatively small number of cases in this category may indicate high variability in this rate.
Another broad measure of possible racial bias is the difference
in the rate at which the prosecution seeks the death penalty as a
function of the defendant's race. Differences in circumstances of aggravation and mitigation may ultimately explain any differences
found in this area as well, but an initial overall analysis is required
to determine if discrepancies exist that require more detailed inquiry. Table 2 below presents that overall relationship.

34. Cramer's V is a statistic designed to measure the degree of association between categorical variables, i.e., variables measured at the nominal level. Perfect positive association
would produce a Cramer's V of 1.00; a value of -1.00 would indicate perfect negative association; and 0.00 would indicate no relationship at all. See generally R. COLE. INTRODUCTION TO
POLITICAL INQUIRY,

chapt. 6 (New York: MacMillan, 1980).
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TABLE 2.
Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Rate Prosecution Seeks Death Sentence and Defendant's Race
Was Death

White

Defendant's Race
Black Hispanic Asian

Other

Row

Totals

Sentence
Sought

Yes

54.0%

54.3%

50.9%

100.0%

25.0%

No

46.0%

45.7%

49.1%

0.0%

75.0%

N=441

N-536

N=57

560
(53.9%)
479
(46.1%)

Column
Totals

N-1

N=4

1,039
(100.0%)

Number of Missing Cases: 13

The same absence of discriminatory effect on the basis of race
noted above is also demonstrated here. The rate at which the prosecutor sought the death penalty is virtually identical for whites
(54.0%) and blacks (54.3%), and the percentage of Hispanics
against whom death was sought was only slightly lower (50.9%). A
Cramer's V of .05 indicates the virtual nonexistence of any relationship between the defendant's race and the prosecution's decision to
seek or decline to seek the death penalty. "Asians" show a 100.0%
rate simply because the single "Asian" against whom the death penalty was sought falls into this category.
Finally, the overall extent to which a defendant's race may affect the sentencing outcome of his or her case may also be estimated
from differences, if any, in the method by which he or she was found
guilty of first-degree murder. Prior research has shown that those
who plead guilty or ask for a nonjury trial, rather than demanding a
jury trial, are more likely to be treated leniently. 5 Table 3 below
summarizes this relation.
35. The instant research also confirmed this finding. For example, of the 847 defendants
who asked for a jury trial, 204 (24.1%) ultimately were sentenced to death. In contrast, 141
defendants had a nonjury trial, and just 6 (4.3%) received a death sentence, while only 3 of
135 who entered a guilty plea (2.2%) were sentenced to death. Self-selection bias, "hopeless
cases," the defendant's intransigence, etc., have all been proposed to explain the nearly six-fold
greater risk of a death sentence when a jury trial is demanded. The resolution of the causes for
this disparity is beyond the bounds of this research.

DEATH SENTENCE IN PENNSYLVANIA

TABLE 3.
Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Means of Guilt Determination and Defendant's Race
Defendant's Race
Means of
White
Black Hispanic
Asian
Other
Guilt Determination
Jury
75.6%
75.4%
73.0%
100.0% 100.0%

Row
Totals
847
(75.4%)

Trial Court

7.5%

15.6%

20.6%

0.0%

0.0%

214
(12.6%)

Guilty Plea

17.0%

9.0%

6.3%

0.0%

0.0%

135
(12.0%)

Column
Totals

N=454

N=601

N=63

N=1

N=4

1,123
(100.0%)

Number of Missing Observations: 51.

Once more, the lack of a racially discriminatory pattern in the
Pennsylvania data is apparent. The percentage of whites (75.6%),
blacks (75.4%), and Hispanics (73.0%) who had a full jury trial
were essentially the same. The Cramer's V figure of .12 confirms this
virtual lack of association between the defendant's race and the
means of his or her guilt determination. Whites are much more
likely to plead guilty (17.0%) than blacks (9.0%) or Hispanics
(6.3%). Whites are also much less likely (7.5%) than blacks
(15.6%) or Hispanics (20.6%) to seek a nonjury trial. However,
these latter differences are not likely to result in significantly higher
or lower rates of death sentencing because death as a case outcome

is very low in cases in which nonjury trials (4.3 %) and guilty pleas
(2.2%) are involved.
C. Race of Victim-Race of Offender Interaction Effects

Baldus8 6 utilized a more refined analysis to identify an ongoing,
post-Gregg pattern of apparent racial discrimination in the death
sentence upon conviction of first-degree murder. This pattern
emerged when the combined effects of race of the offender and race
of the victim were considered simultaneously. To preliminarily evaluate the Pennsylvania data for the presence of this interaction effect,
a new measure was constructed to assess this dimension of variability. First, both race of offender and victim's race were dichotomized
36. See generally

EQUAL JUSTICE,

supra note 26.
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into white and nonwhite. Then the four combinations of these two
dichotomies were treated as a new categorical variable. The outcomes of a cross-tabulation of this constructed variable and sentencing disposition are set out below in Table 4.
TABLE 4.

Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Race of Victim-Race of Offender Interaction Effects and Death Sentencing
Race of Victim and Race of Offender
Row
White
White
Nonwhite
Nonwhite
Sentencing
Totals
Kills
Kills
Kills
Kills
Outcome
White
White
Nonwhite
Nonwhite
960
81.0%
89.5%
69.6%
84.8%
Life
1_(81.8%)
214
19.0%
10.5%
30.4%
15.2%
Death
(18.2%)

Column
Totals

N=572

N=138

N=38

N=426

1,174
(100.0%)

In contrast to the patterns presented by the aggregated Pennsylvania data in the associations detailed above, some substantial differences in rates of death sentencing as a function of race of offender-race of victim interactions are evident in Table 4. Ranked
from lowest to highest, the percentages of capital sentencing are
10.5% when a white kills a nonwhite, 15.2% when a nonwhite kills
a nonwhite, 19.0% when a white kills another white, and 30.4%
when a nonwhite kills a white. While this pattern is consistent with
that found by Baldus, the discrepancies are not as extreme. In Pennsylvania during the post-Gregg period (and before imposition of controls for circumstances of aggravation and mitigation), a nonwhite
who murders a white has almost a three times greater chance
(30.4%) of receiving the death penalty than does a white who kills a
nonwhite (10.5%). However, the overall data structure exhibited
above among all four categories is not strong as is shown by a
Cramer's V .13 for this Table. Finally, it should be reiterated that
the differences between categories in rate of capital sentencing as
manifested here in the aggregate may be eliminated when controls
are imposed for aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
D.

The Effects of Gender

Because the supreme court has ruled that the death penalty
must be even-handedly applied, its application would presumably be
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unconstitutional if based upon immutable personal characteristics
such as race, age, sex, or national origin. However, the court has
rejected statistical evidence of such discriminatory application of the
death penalty and demanded instead that any such claim be supported by evidence of discrimination against the individual defendant. s7 The statistical evidence on gender based applications of the
death penalty in Pennsylvania is presented in this section.
In the data studied in this research, the vast majority of the
defendants, 1,129 (96.2%), were male. Only 45 (3.8%) women were
convicted of first degree murder in Pennsylvania from 1978 through
1989. This extreme gender disparity in murder defendants is not reflected in the gender of victims. Of the 1,174 cases studied 758
(64.6%) victims were male, and 379 (32.3 %) were female. 8
To determine whether or not disparities existed in the rate of
sentencing to death on the basis of gender, cross-tabulation was performed on these two variables. The results of that analysis are set
out below in Table 5.
TABLE 5.

Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Sentencing Outcome and Defendant's Gender
Defendant's Gender
Sentencing
Male
Female

Row

Outcome

Totals

Life

81.1%

97.8%

Death

18.9%

2.2%

N= 1,129

N=45

Column
Totals

960
(81.8%)
214
(18.2%)
1,174
(100.0%)

As indicated in Table 5, 218 (18.9%) males are sentenced to
death while only 1 (2.2%) woman was sentenced to death. The
strength of the association is shown by a value for Gamma of 0.82,"
indicating a near-perfect association between sex and risk of a death
sentence after conviction of first degree murder. If the supreme court
is to be consistent, it should also find such extreme disparity to be at
least constitutionally suspect, if not constitutionally impermissible.
37. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298-99, 317-18 (1987).
38. On this variable, 37 cases had missing data.
39. Gamma is a statistical measure of ordinal level association. A two-by-two categorical table can be treated as an ordinal relationship, hence the relevancy of Gamma for this
table. See generally R. COLE, supra note 34.
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We recognize that these are aggregate data and that controls for
aggravating and mitigating circumstances may ultimately explain
these seeming disparities.
The question also arises as to whether or not interactions between the sex of the offender and the sex of the victim may affect
the likelihood that the offender will be sentenced to death. To preliminarily examine this possibility, another new four-category variable was created to capture the dimension of sex of offender and sex
of victim. This new factor was then cross-tabulated with sentencing
outcome. The results of that analysis are set out below in Table 6.
TABLE 6.
Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Gender of Victim-Gender of Offender Interaction Effects and Death
Sentencing
Gender of Victim and Gender of Offender
Sentencing
Female
Female
Male
Male
Row
Outcome
Kills
Kills
Kills
Kills
Totals
Female
Male
Female
Male
Life
94.1%
100.0%
74.0%
84.0%
925
(81.4%)

Death

5.9%

0.0%

26.0%

16.0%

212
(18.6%)

Column
Totals

N=17

N=27

Number of Missing Observations

=

N=362

N=741

1,137
(100.0%)

37

Little effect of sex of offender/sex of victim interactions appears
in the rate of death sentencing in the aggregate. A Cramer's V of
.15 for this Table reflects this low overall association. The most probable explanation for this finding is the extraordinarily low rate at
which the death penalty is imposed on females.
Among female offenders, essentially no effect of the gender of
the victim is present. Again, this is most likely a function of the
extraordinarily low death penalty rate for females. However, the percentage of men who kill women and receive the death penalty
(26.0%) is 80% higher than the percentage of men who kill other
men and receive the death penalty (16.0%). Even here the vast majority of male killers still receive a life sentence, whether the victim
is female (74.0%) or male (84.0%). Note, however, that aggregate
differences among male offenders as a function of the sex of the victim may be accounted for by controls for circumstances of aggravation and mitigation, which are examined below.
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As noted above in the discussion of the aggregate effects of
race, the choice of fact finder for determining the guilt of the defendant has a strong relationship to the likelihood that the offender
will be sentenced to death. Defendants who demand a jury trial have
nearly a six fold greater risk of being sentenced to death than do
those who plead guilty or who opt for a nonjury trial. Therefore, the
question arises as to whether gender may also be related to means of
guilt determination. The results of a cross-tabulation of defendant's
gender and the nature of the fact finder mechanism by which the
defendant's guilt was determined are set out below in Table 7.
Table 7 shows relatively little difference in the rate of demand
for full jury trial on the basis of gender. As indicated, 817 (75.7%)
of the males and 30 (68.2%) of females demanded and were given a
jury trial. Virtually no difference existed between males (12.0%)
and females (11.4 %) in guilty pleas. Cramer's V of .05 for this table
summarizes the virtual absence of relationship between gender and
means of guilt determination. This finding is significant in light of
the extreme difference observed in the rate of actual death sentencing between males and females.
TABLE 7.
Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Means of Guilt Determination and Defendant's Gender
Defendant's Gender
Means of Guilt
Male
Female
Determination
Jury
75.7%
68.2%
1_

(75.4%)

Trial Court

12.2%

20.5%

Guilty Plea

12.0%

11.4%

N = 1,079

N=44

Column
Totals

Row
Totals
847
141
(12.6%)
135
(12.0%)
1,123
(100.0%)

Number of Missing Observations: 51
It appears that the high risk of death assumed when demanding a
jury trial applies only to men and not to women. Women are likely
to receive a life sentence no matter what mechanism they choose to
determine the issue of guilt or innocence.
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TABLE 8.
Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Prosecutorial Decision to Seek the Death Penalty and Defendant's Gender
Defendant's Gender

Was the Death
Penalty Sought
Yes

Male

Female

Row

54.6%

38.1%

Totals
560

45.4%

61.9%

(53.9%)

No

479
(46.1%)

Column
Totals

N-997

N=42

1,039
(100.0%)

Number of Missing Observations: 135

One possible explanation for the extreme aggregate disparity in
probability of a sentence to death as a function of gender may be the
prosecutorial decision to seek or not to seek the death penalty at the
time of trial. To examine for this possibility, the gender of the defendant was cross-tabulated against that prosecutorial determination. Results of that analysis are set out above in Table 8.
The prosecution sought the death penalty against 544 (54.6 %)
of the males and 16 (38.1 %) of the females convicted of first degree
murder during the period studied. Thus, the prosecution sought
death for women at about two-thirds the rate exhibited for men. The
Cramer's V for this table is .07 and indicates that virtually no association exists between the defendant's sex and the prosecutor's decision on whether or not to seek the death penalty. This finding is
significant in light of the extreme disparity of outcomes on the basis
of sex as noted above.
This disparity of sentencing outcomes might also be explained
by some systematic, qualitative difference in the types of murders
committed by women as opposed to those perpetrated by men. Unfortunately, data were not available to test directly this hypothesis.
However, it might be argued that the percentage of cases involving
male defendants in which prosecutors allege the presence of one or
more aggravating circumstances, compared with that same percentage for female defendants, might provide an indirect measure of any
differences in the fundamental attributes of "male" versus "female"
murders. The idea here is that prosecutors have both the interest and
the duty to insure that murderers are fully prosecuted for their
crime, irrespective of their personal characteristics. Therefore, the
presence or absence of allegations of aggravating circumstances at a
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convicted defendant's sentencing hearing should offer an indirect,
gender-independent gauge of the underlying qualities of the defendant's crime.
Our data indicate no serious disparity between males and females on this standard. Of the 1,129 male defendants studied,
57.5 % (649) faced no aggravating circumstance charge at sentencing, and 64.4% of the female defendants also were free of this allegation at their sentencing hearings. Prosecutors alleged one or more
aggravating circumstances against male defendants in 42.5% (480
of 1,129) of all cases against men and in 35.6% (16 of 45) sentencing hearings involving a female accused.' 0 Men are alleged to have
committed a single aggravating circumstance in 21.1% (238 of
1,129) of their cases, while the rate for women is even higher 26.7% (12 of 45). Males are charged with two aggravating circumstances in 13.1% (148 of 1,129) of the sentencing hearings, but the
rate for women charged with two aggravating circumstances is just
8.9% (4 of 45). Only men face allegations of three, four, or five
aggravating circumstances - 8.4% (94 of 1,129). These figures
show a mild polarization in favor of women defendants, but the extreme disparity in sentencing to death noted above in Table 5 cannot
be explained on this basis.
If the explanation for the gender-specific differences in sentencing outcomes does not lie in the underlying attributes of the cases or
in prosecutorial discretion to treat women more leniently at sentencing, then it must lie with the court or the jury that determines the
sentence. The overall rates at which the court or the juries found
alleged aggravating circumstances to have been proven can be used
as a measure to test this possibility. At this point, however, women
still enjoy no pronounced advantage. After the sentencing hearing,
80.8 % (912 of 1,129) of the male defendants faced no proven aggravating circumstance. Forty of forty-five (88.9%) female defendants
had no aggravating circumstance proven against them beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, about 81 % of the convicted males and 89 % of
the guilty females could not be sentenced to death. Only those who
had one or more aggravating circumstances proven against them 19.2% (217) of the men and 11.1% (5) of the women - faced the
possibility of the ultimate penalty. The discrepancies identified above
40. Once again, it should be noted that because our study examines all death penalty
cases in Pennsylvania, tests of statistical significance are inapposite. Our work and the inferences drawn therefrom apply to the entire population of interest - all defendants convicted of
first-degree murder in Pennsylvania between 1978 and 1989, not just a more or less representative sample from that population.
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in Table 5 must lie in this latter group of convicted men and women.
Clearly, the major differences in rates of capital sentencing between men and women lie in areas in which specific aggravating circumstances have been proven against defendants. Table 9 below
presents data on the numbers and percentages of specific aggravating circumstances alleged and proven by gender. In addition, the
percentage of alleged aggravating circumstances that result in a
death sentence is also set out for male and female defendants for the
most often-used aggravating circumstances.
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TABLE 9.
Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Gender and Allegation and Proof of Aggravating Circumstances
Trial Usage, Success, and Sentencing Outcomes
No.
Allegd

Major Aggravating
Circumstances
1. The killing was committed
during the perpetration of
a felony.
2. Defendant knowingly created
a grave risk of death to
other than victim.
3. Significant history of violent
felony convictions.

* -4

4. The murder was committed
by means of torture.
5. Convictions of other crimes
for which life imprisonment
could have been imposed.
6. Prior conviction of another
first-degree murder.
7. Victim was prosecution witness against defendant in
another murder or felony.
8. The defendant paid someone
else to commit the murder.
9. The defendant received pay-.
ment from another person to
commit the murder.
10. The victim was a public
servant (police officer,
firefighter, other).
11. All Other Aggravating
Circumstances.

Column
Totals

Totals

No.
Proven
~-',

52.0%

4

32.9%

(81)

M

153

63

36.4%
41.2%

9.1%
26.1%

(1)1
(40)

F
M

0
124

0
46

0.0%
37.1%

0.0%
29.8%

(0)
(37)

F
M

1
93

1
42

100.0%
45.2%

100.0%
35.5%

(1)2
(33)

F
M

1
77

0
39

0.0%
50.7%

0.0%
36.4%

(0)
(28)

F
M

0
44

0
33

0.0%
75.0%

0.0%
54.6%

(0)
(24)

F
M

1
41

1
18

100.0%
43.9%

0.0%
34.2%

(0)
(14)

F
M

1
24

0
6

0.0%
25.0%

0.0%
25.0%

(0)
(6)

F
M

3
25

0
10

0.0%
40.0%

0.0%
24.0%

(0)
(6)

F
M

I1
17

0
8

0.0%
47.1%

0.0%
35.3%

(0)
(6)

F

0

0

0.0%

0.0%
30.8%

(0)
(4)

0.0%

(0)

46.2%

100.0%

M
!

No.
Pct.
Death Death

Pct.
Proven

F

857
....
20

399

...

6

46.6%

32.6% (279)

............
30.0%
5.0%

(1)

The single female sentenced to death is the same person sentenced to death under aggravating circumstance 3 below.
2 The single female sentenced to death is the same person sentenced to death under aggravating circumstance I above.

Overall, Table 9 shows large discrepancies between male and
female defendants in both the rates at which allegations of specific
aggravating circumstances are found proven. Even greater genderspecific disparities are found in the ultimate rates of death sentencing. Among all convicted female defendants, only one woman received the death penalty. Thus, only when the proven aggravating
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circumstance is a "significant history of prior convictions for violent
felonies" does the rate of sentencing females to death (100.0%) exceed the rate of death sentences meted out to convicted males
(29.8%). For every other type of proven aggravating circumstance,
the percentage of males accused of that circumstance who are also
sentenced to death greatly exceeds the female death sentencing rate
for that same aggravating circumstance. This variance ranges from
32.9% for males to 9.1% for females for the "killing during the
perpetration of a felony" aggravating circumstance, to a high of
54.6 % for males and 0.0% for females for the "prior conviction of
another first-degree murder" aggravating circumstance. Thus, when
cases are grouped by the specific aggravating circumstance alleged
against a convicted defendant at sentencing, the large variation in
the rates of death sentencing between males and females becomes
readily apparent. These are precisely the "similar case" comparisons
required by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the Frey case.41 No
conscientiously performed "proportionality study" of death sentencing outcomes between males and females could fail to unearth these
manifest inconsistencies.
In the eleven year post-Gregg history of capital sentencing in
Pennsylvania for which data have been collected, only one woman
was sentenced to death. Clearly, what gender-based bias may exist is
more likely to be located among juries than among prosecutors or
judges. The relatively equivalent percentages of demand for jury
trial between men and women and the rough comparability in the
rate that prosecutors seek the death penalty for men and women
simply reinforce this conclusion.
E. The Effects of Rural and Urban Residence
Death penalty critics have suggested that convicted murderers
from urban areas are significantly more likely to be sentenced to
death than those who reside in rural areas. To search for the presence or absence of these same effects, the post-Gregg Pennsylvania
data studied herein were also analyzed for the consequences of urbanization. A new variable was added to the data set, measuring in
each Pennsylvania county the percentage of the population who live
in an urbanized area. Data summarizing that percentage were taken
from the 1980 Census of Population: Number of Inhabitants, Pennsylvania, series PC80-1-A40, as updated to 1988. For each case, the
41.

See Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428, 475 A.2d 700 (1984).
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county in which the murder was committed was taken as the determinant of the urbanization percentage assigned to that case. Finally,
the extent of urbanization for each case was collapsed into five categories - All Rural, Mainly Rural, Mixed, Mainly Urban, and All
Urban. The boundaries of these categories were calculated from the
unweighted mean and standard deviation for all Pennsylvania counties.42 Based on this operational definition of urbanization, 753
(64.1%) cases occurred in "All Urban" counties; 179 (15.2%) of
the murders studied were committed in "Mainly Urban" counties;
150 (12.85) took place in "Mixed" counties; 80 (6.8%) occurred in
"Mainly Rural" counties; and only 12 (1.0%) were committed in
"All Rural" counties. The categorized percentage of urbanized residents in the county was then used as the stratifying variable for further analyses. Table 10 below summarizes the relationship between
this new variable and the sentencing disposition for convicted
offenders.
TABLE 10.
Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Degree of County Urbanization and Death Sentencing
Degree of County Urbanization
Sentencing All Rural Mainly Mixed
Mainly
All Urban
Disposition
Rural
Urban
Life
91.7%
87.5%
81.3%
64.8%
85.1%

Totals
960

(81.8%)
Death

8.3%

12.5%

18.7%

35.2%

14.9%

214
(18.2%)

Totals

N=12

N=80

N=150

N=179

N=753

1,174
(100.0%)

Cramer's V of 0.19 for Table 10 clearly indicates that there is
no consistent association between the degree of urbanization and the
likelihood that a death sentence will be imposed. Clearly, this lack of
aggregate association is due primarily to the "All Urban" category,
in which the percentage sentenced to death (14.9%) drops dramatically from the next closest category (35.2%). Note that of the 715

cases in the "All Urban" category, 615 come from Philadelphia, reflecting a general biasing effect of the Philadelphia data in the state42. The unweighted county means for urbanization is 40.07%, and the standard deviation is 27.31%. Based on these figures, All Rural was defined as 0.0% to 12.75% urbanized;
Mainly Rural was defined as more than 12.7% to 40.1% urbanized; Mixed was defined as
more than 40.1% to 67.4% urbanized; Many Urban was defined as more than 67.4% to
94.7% urbanized; and All Urban was defined as more than 94.7% urbanized.
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wide analysis. If the "All Urban," i.e., Philadelphia, cases are excluded, the remaining four categories show a direct relationship
between an increase in the level of urbanization and an increase in
the imposition of death sentences. This rate was just 8.3% in the
"All Rural" counties, 12.0% in "Mainly Rural" counties, 18.7% in
"Mixed" counties, and 35.2% in "Mainly Urban" counties. The progression here is clear, except for Philadelphia and its environs. As
the degree of county urbanization increases, the chances that a convicted first-degree murderer will receive the death penalty escalate
quickly.
In spite of its lower rate of death sentencing, almost two-thirds
(64.1 %) of the murders resulting in a first-degree conviction over
the period studied herein, and 112 of the 214 cases in which the
death sentence was imposed (52.3%), came from the "All Urban"
category, i.e., from the nearly totally urbanized areas.
In contrast to the relatively low rate of capital sentencing in
more rural Pennsylvania counties, those same less urbanized areas
reveal a higher rate of prosecutorial effort to obtain a death sentence. In rural areas, prosecutors seem to make proportionally heavier efforts to subject convicted defendants to the death sentence, but
they are relatively less-successful in these efforts than are their counterparts in more urbanized counties. These relationships are reflected
in Table 11 below.
TABLE 1).
Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
County Urbanization and Prosecutorial Efforts to Achieve a Death Sentence
Degree of County Urbanization
Was Death All Rural Mainly Mixed Mainly All Urban
Totals
Penalty
Rural
Urban
Sought
Yes
83.3%
57.5%
48.6% 66.7%
50.5%
560
(53.9%)

No

16.7%

42.5%

51.4%

33.3%

49.5%

479
(46.1%)

Totals

N=12

N-80

N-144

N=-177

N=626

1,039

(100.0%)
Number of Missing Observations: 135
In spite of the pattern of lower urbanization associated with
heavier efforts to achieve a death, sentence, the entire table shows
relatively little aggregate association. The Cramer's V of 0.14 sum-
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marizes this relative lack of overall relationship between degree of
county urbanization and rate of seeking the death penalty. The highest rate (66.7 %) is found in "Mainly Urban" counties. Over the entire period for which data were collected, the prosecutor sought the
death penalty in just over one-half of the cases.
There is a virtual tie at the lowest rate between "Mixed"
(48.6%) and "All Urban" (50.5%) counties, most likely reflecting
greater resource limitations, or perhaps a type of bureaucratic exhaustion. It is also possible that prosecutors in these counties have
different philosophical positions on the death penalty than their
counterparts in urban areas.
The extent to which degree of county urbanization affects sentencing outcome may also be estimated from differences, if any, in
the method by which the defendant was found guilty of first-degree
murder. As noted earlier, prior research has shown that courts are
more likely to grant leniency to those who plead guilty or request
and receive a nonjury trial, than those who demand a jury trial. The
relationship between this variable and degree of county urbanization
is set out below in Table 12.
TABLE 12.

Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Means of Guilt Determination and County Urbanization
Means of
Guilt
Determination
Jury

Degree of County Urbanization
All Rural Mainly Mixed Mainly All Urban
Rural
Urban
100.0%

71.3%

76.0%

73.2%

75.9%

Totals
847
(75.4%)

Trial Court

0.0%

7.5%

6.2%

5.6%

16.4%

141
(12.6%)

Guilty Plea
Totals

0.0%

21.3%

17.8%

N=-12

N-80 N=146 N=179

21.2%

7.6%
N=706

35
(12.0%)
1,123
(100.0%)

Number of Missing Observations: 51
A low Cramer's V of 0.16 again evidences the lack of any overall aggregate level association between means of guilt determination
and degree of county urbanization. Note the exclusivity of the jury
trial as the means of guilt determination in most rural counties 100.0% jury trial rate for "All Rural" counties. Thus, in rural coun-
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ties all convicted first degree murderers received a jury trial (and
thus were subject to the highest risk factor for death sentencing)
(see Table 12), but they also experienced the lowest rate of death
penalty sentences (Table 10). Table 12 shows relative equality of
jury trial rate - 71.3%, 76.0%, 73.3%, and 75.9% - in the other
four categories.
The primary differences in the four largest categories are in
rates of guilty pleas versus nonjury trials. Both the highest percentage of nonjury trials (16.4 %) and lowest rate of guilty pleas (7.5 %)
are found in the most urbanized counties. However, the relative risk
of a death sentence remains low for both nonjury trials and guilty
pleas..
F. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
The Pennsylvania death penalty statute defines sixteen aggravating circumstances, at least one of which must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt as a precondition for the imposition of a death penalty.'3 The sixteen statutory conditions are separated into twenty-one
data elements for data collection purposes on the above-noted "Report Form" which must be submitted to the Administrative Office of
the Pennsylvania Courts. Over the twelve years studied, prosecutors
across the Commonwealth alleged 874 of these "aggravating circumstances" in the 1,174 first-degree murder convictions analyzed.
The prosecution pursued ten of these aggravating circumstances
in just three or fewer instances - when the victim was: a firefighter,
another type of public servant, held for ransom by the defendant(s),
held as a hostage, killed in an aircraft hijacking, an informant, a
child under twelve years of age; when the killing was drug related;
when the murder was the result of drug competition; or when the
defendant had prior manslaughter convictions. Prosecutors alleged
one other "aggravating circumstance" separately identified on the
data collection "Report Form" in fewer than one percent of the firstdegree murder convictions studied herein, i.e., when the defendant
was already under a life sentence at the time of the murder - 9
(0.8 %) cases. These eleven "aggravating circumstances" comprised
only 18 (2.3 %) of the 874 prosecutorial allegations of aggravation.
Because of their essential nonuse, the presence or absence of these
eleven has little effect on the pattern of sentencing to death or life
imprisonment in Pennsylvania cases and are, therefore, excluded
43. 42

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 9711(c)(iii) & (d) (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1990).
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from the following analysis.
The ten remaining "aggravating circumstances" accounted for
856 (97.7%) of the 874 "aggravating circumstances" alleged by
prosecutors in the 1,174 first-degree murder convictions studied. In
12 (1.0%) instances, the victim was a peace officer; in another 12
(2.2%) the district attorney alleged that the defendant received payment for the killing; and in 27 (2.3%) others, the prosecution
claimed that the defendant paid another to perform the killing. In 42
(3.6%) cases, the district attorney alleged that the victim was a witness against the defendant in another case; in 45 (3.8%) instances
the defendant had been convicted of prior murders; in 77 (6.6%)
prosecutions the accused was presented as a state or federal convict
at the time of the killing; and homicide involving torture was
claimed in 94 (8.0%) cases. Finally, three "aggravating circumstances" were asserted more frequently than any other - the defendant's history of prior felony convictions in 125 (10.6%) cases,
the creation of a substantial risk of harm to someone other than the
victim during the killing in 150 (12.8 %).prosecutions, and the commission of the murder during the perpetration of another felony in
258 (22.0%) cases. Table 13 summarizes these allegations of "aggravating circumstances" together with the prosecution's success in
proving those assertions beyond a reasonable doubt and in ultimately
achieving a death sentencing."'
The overwhelming conclusion to be drawn from the data
presented in Table 13 is the lack of success of prosecutors both in
proving the aggravating circumstances that they allege and in ultimately attaining the death penalty. District Attorneys across the
Commonwealth were least successful in proving that the defendant
had paid another to commit the murder (22.2%). Even with prior
convictions for first degree murder (matters which should involve little more than presenting evidence of an official criminal record)
prosecutors were able to prove this aggravating circumstance in just
75.6 % of the cases. Notably, this category is the one in which prosecutors also show the highest rate of ultimate attainment of the death
sentence (53.3%).
44. The data reported under Other are numbers and percentages of cases in which the
apposite aggravating circumstances was alleged at the sentencing hearing, found not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, and yet in which the death penalty was ultimately returned by the
jury or the court. By statutory definition, at least one aggravating circumstance must have

been found beyond a reasonable doubt before the death penalty can be imposed. Logically,
therefore, numbers and percentages of cases in the Other category are those in which at least
one other aggravating circumstance had been alleged and proven.
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Table 13 also reveals that the three most frequently alleged aggravating circumstances - killing during a felony, creating a grave
risk of death to another during the killing, and the defendant's history of violent felony convictions - have rates of proof of 40% to
50% and ultimate attainment of a death sentence at about a 30%
rate. In contrast, the remaining aggravating elements show substantially lower death sentence rates.
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TABLE 13.
Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Allegation, Proof and Successes of Aggravating Circumstances
Trial Usage and Outcomes
I

A

+;OJJ P;,va11

I

+

AI11

A

f.

flhAe5g4J uy

Prosecution

1. The killing was committed during
the perpetration of a felony.

258
(100.0%)
150

2. In the commission of the offense, defendant knowingly
created a grave risk of death
to another than the victim.
3. Defendant has a significant
history of felony convictions
involving
"violence. use or threat of

0

If1

Sentencing
132
(51.2%)
63

to Death
82
(31.8%)
Other 21
(18.1%)
40

(100.0%)

(42.0%)

125
(100.0%)

47
(37.6%)'

4. The murder was committed by
means of torture.

94
(100.0%)

42
(44.7%)

5. Prior conviction of other
Federal or State crimes for
which life imprisonment
could have been imposed.
6. Prior conviction of another
first-degree murder.

77
(100.0%)

39
(50.7%)

45
(100.0%)

34
(75.6%)

7. Victim was a prosecution witness
against defendant in another
murder or felony prosecution
against defendant.
8. The defendant paid someone else
to commit the murder.

42
(100.0%)

18
(42.9%)

27
(100.0%)

6
(22.2%)

9. The defendant received payment
from another person to commit
the murder.

26
(100.0%)

10
(38.5%)

6
(23.1%)
Other 2
(7.7%)

12
(100.0%)

5
(41.7%)

856
(100.0%)

396
(46.3%)

3
(25.0%)
Other 2
(16.7%)
274
(32.0%)
Other 130
(15.2%)

(26.7%)
Other 23
(15.3%)o
38
(30.4%)
Other 33
(26.4%)
33
(35.1%)
Other 9
(9.6%)
28
(36.4%)
Other 26
(33.8%)
24
(53.3%)
Other 0
(0.0%)
14
(33.3%)
Other 8
(19.1%)
6
(22.2%)
Other 6

(22.2%)

10. The victim was a peace officer.

Column
Totals
1

Furthermore, an analysis of the significant numbers and percentages of cases in the Other category indicates that prosecutors
commonly allege multiple aggravating elements. They also indicate
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probable interaction effects among aggravating circumstances in producing death sentences. Multivariate analytic techniques must be
used to tap those interactions.
Table 13 also indicates that juries and the court deal substantially more harshly with convicted defendants whose aggravating element is a prior first degree murder conviction. In these cases, 53.3 %
of defendants were sentenced to death, and substantially lower death
penalty rates were evident for payees and payors for murder, killers
of peace officers, and defendants who created a "grave risk of death
to another" while committing the primary murder.
To further analyze the probable impact of these ten "aggravating circumstances," a new measure was created that combined the
presence or absence of the allegation of an aggravating circumstance, its success or failure of proof beyond reasonable doubt, and a
sentencing disposition of death or life. Each component is a dummy
variable with values of "0" and "1." With respect to allegation and
proof, therefore, four logical possibilities exist. First, an "aggravating
circumstance" can be both alleged and proven. This would be one
valid category on the newly constructed variable. Second, an "aggravating circumstance" can be alleged but not proven. This, too, would
be a valid division on the newly constructed variable. Third, an "aggravating circumstance" can logically be unalleged but found to
have been proven by the jury or court. However, this category on the
newly constructed variable is legally invalid and thus is dropped.
Finally, an "aggravating circumstance" can be both unalleged and
unproven. This would be a valid, but entirely irrelevant, cluster on
the newly constructed variable. Consequently, it too is dropped.
The first two combinations were then linked with the two sentencing disposition alternatives - life and death. The resulting five
categories on the newly created variable are: 1) Alleged, Proven,
Sentence of Death; 2) Alleged, Proven, Life Sentence; 3) Alleged,
Not Proven, Sentence of Death; 4) Alleged, Not Proven, Life Sentence; and 5) Not Alleged. The resulting measures were then used to
control the allegation and proof of aggravating and mitigating circumstances on the patterned relationships noted above in the analysis of aggregate data.
G. Aggravating Circumstances and the Effects of Race
Table 14 presents the results of the analysis for the most frequently alleged aggravating element, commission of a simultaneous
felony, and the propensity of prosecutors to allege multiple aggravat-
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ing elements in first degree murder prosecutions.
TABLE 14.

Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Allegation and Proof of Commission of Contemporaneous Felony,
Sentencing Outcome, and Number of Aggravating Circumstances Proven
Number of Proven Aggravating Circumstances
Commission of
Simultaneous
Felony
Not Alleged

0

1

2

3

4

5

Row
Totals

86.9%

49.5%

38.0%

17.6%

45.5%

0.0%

916

(78.0%)
Alleged
Proven, Death
Alleged
Proven, Life

0.0%

17.5%

43.7%

70.6%

27.3%

100.0%

0.0%

26.2%

15.5%

11.8%

27.3%

0.0%

Alleged, Not

2.0%

2.9%

2.8%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

11.1%

3.6%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

N=952

N-103

N-71

N-34

N=3

Proven, Death
Alleged, Not
Proven, Life
Column
Totals

1

79
(6.7%)
45
(3.8%)
24

(2.4%)
35
(3.1%)
N=4
1,123
(100.0%)

Number of Missing Observations: 0

The result when allegation of commission of a simultaneous felony is compared with the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances alleged and proven in specific cases is quite clear. When
the prosecutors achieve the death penalty (the second and fourth
rows of Table 14), a propensity to charge multiple aggravating circumstances is evident. Prosecutors are much more likely to be successful in proving this allegation, however, when they simultaneously
allege one, two, or three other aggravating elements. Accordingly,
juries and the court are apparently more likely to find proof of a
simultaneous felony beyond a reasonable doubt when other aggravating circumstances are also alleged than when one or no other aggravating elements has been presented. One possible explanation is simply that multiple aggravating elements are present in the most
serious cases, and these are the cases in which the simultaneous commission of a felony is most easily proven.
A pattern similar to that presented in Table 14 also emerges for
most of the other nine commonly alleged aggravating elements.
When the prosecution is successful in achieving a death sentence,
multiple aggravating elements have been alleged and proven. Allega-
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tion of a small number of aggravating elements is much less likely to
result in the death penalty for the convicted defendant. This relationship between allegation and proof of multiple aggravating elements
and ultimate sentencing decision seems to be that which was intended by the reforms precipitated by Furman and Gregg. The death
penalty in Pennsylvania is much more frequently invoked when multiple aggravating circumstances have been alleged and proven.
The intent of the Pennsylvania death penalty statute also seems
to be fulfilled with regard to mitigating circumstances. The mechanism used by defense attorneys to achieve this statutory intent, however, is to present as large a number of mitigating elements as possible in the hope that the death penalty can be avoided. While the
prosecution must prove aggravating elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, the defense need only prove its mitigating circumstances by a
preponderance of the evidence.45 Table 15 presents a cross-tabulation of the constructed variable on alleged commission of a simultaneous felony and a count of the number of mitigating circumstances
presented by defense attorneys in those cases.
Significantly, rows three and five represent the instances in
which the defense has been successful in avoiding the death penalty
for the defendant. These two rows also demonstrate the highest instance of allegation of large numbers of mitigating circumstances.
Specifically, seven cases alleged ten mitigating circumstances, and
all seven resulted in life imprisonment rather than death. When less
than three mitigating circumstances were presented, the defendant's
chances of receiving the death penalty were significantly higher."

45. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iii) (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1990).
46. When no mitigating circumstances are presented and simultaneous commission of a
felony is alleged, the defendant receives death in 2.7% of the 729 such cases. When only one
mitigating circumstance is presented by the defense and the prosection alleges the felony aggravating circumstance, death is the outcome in 20.2% of the cases. Finally, when two mitigating circumstances are offered and the prosecution counters with the felony aggravation,
death is the result in 16.6% of the cases. Clearly, defense attorneys risk the death sentence for

their clients by failure to present a large number of mitigating elements.
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TABLE 15.

Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Allegation and Proof of Commission of Contemporaneous Felony,
Sentencing Outcome, and Number of Mitigating Circumtances Proven
Number of Mitigating Circumstances Alleged
Commission
of
Simultaneous

0

1

2

3

4

6

1

7

1

1

1

Rowe
Totls

Felony
Not Alleged

92.5%

57.1%

61.8%

57.4%

50.7%

36.8%

57.1%

66.7%

33.3%

0.0%

0.0%

916
(78.0%)

Alleged,Proven,
Death

1.5%

19.0%

13.7%

13.9%

12.3%

31.6%

0.0%

0.0%

33.3%

0.0%

0.0%

79
(7.6%)

Alleged,Proven,
Life

0.5%

7.1%

7.8%

6.5%

8.2%

13.2%

14.3%

0.0%

16.7%

0.0%

71.4%

45
(3.8%)

Alleged.Not
Proven, Death

1.2%

1.2%

2.9%

4.6%

4.1%

0.0%

9.5%

0.0%

16.7%

0.0%

0.0%

24
(2.0%)

Alleged.Not
Proven,Life

4.3%

15.5%

13.7%

17.6%

24.7%

18.4%

19.0%
33.3%
90t(29.4

0.0%

28.6%

00%

N-729

N-84

N-102

N-108

N-73

N-38

N-21

N-6

N-0

Column
Totals

N-6

N7

1,123
(00.0%)

Number of Mising Observbotions:
0

An examination of the progression in percentages in each of the
rows as a function of the number of mitigating circumstances
presented adds further significance. Row two shows that when the
prosecution is able to prove a simultaneous felony as an aggravating
circumstance, the rate of imposition of death rises with the number
of aggravating circumstances presented - 1.5 % with no mitigating
circumstances, 19.0% with one mitigating element, 13.7% with two
mitigating circumstances, 13.9% with three, 12.3% with four mitigating elements, 31.6% with five, and 33.3% when eight potentially
mitigating elements are presented. Cases in which a larger number
of mitigating circumstances are presented either are more serious or
hopeless, or juries and the courts give grave weight to proof of commission of a simultaneous felony in reaching their sentencing decision. The reverse of this pattern also seems to be true. When the
prosecution alleges but fails to prove the contemporaneous commission of a felony, the rate of sentence to life imprisonment increases
regularly with the number of mitigating circumstances alleged none, 4.3%; one, 15.5%; two, 13.7%; three, 17.6%; four, 24.7%;
five, 18.4%; six, 19.0%; seven, 33.3%; and ten, 28.6%.
When interaction between race of offender and race of victim
were simultaneously considered in the aggregate analysis reported
above, a potentially disparate imposition of the death penalty was
identified. McCleskey found a much more pronounced pattern in the
examination of the Georgia data. The question was raised, however,
whether the disparities noted in the aggregate might be explained by
different patterns of aggravation and mitigation between the four
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categories of race of victim and race of offender. The variables constructed on the aggravating elements as noted above can be used to
determine if aggregate differences disappear when controls are imposed for these statutorily defined circumstances. Table 16 displays
the results of the analysis that controls for the most frequently alleged aggravating element, commission of a felony simultaneously
with the primary killing.
Controlling for this aggravating circumstance obviously does not
eliminate the dissimilarities in aggregate rates of death sentencing as
a function of race of offender/race of victim interactions. Prosecutors allege and prove this circumstance of aggravation and ultimately obtain a death sentence against the defendant in 7.7 % of the
cases in which a white has killed another white, no cases when a
white has killed a minority group member, 13.8 % of the prosecutions in which a nonwhite has killed a white, and only 4.4 % of the
cases in which a nonwhite has killed another nonwhite. The rate for
the most suspect category, nonwhites killing whites, is nearly twice
as great as the percentage for whites who kill other whites (7.7%).
Even more significantly, no white who killed a nonwhite was charged
with this aggravating circumstance, hence no one from this category
was sentenced to death. Thus, rather than eliminating the race of
victim/race of offender disparities noted at the aggregate level, imposition of control for allegation and proof of the simultaneous felony aggravating circumstance widens, rather than narrows, these
differences. Either very important differences exist in the circumstances surrounding the murder of whites by nonwhites, as opposed
to the killings of nonwhites by whites and all intra-racial killings, or
a significant element of racial discrimination still exists in Pennsylvania's use of the death sentence upon conviction of first-degree
murder.
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TABLE 16.
Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Allegation and Proof of Commission of Contemporaneous Felony.
Sentencing Outcome, and Race of Offender/Race of Victim
Commission of
Simultaneous
Felony
Note Alleged
Alleged,
Proven, Death
Alleged,
Proven, Life
Alleged, Not
Proven, Death
Alleged, Not
Proven, Life
Column
Totals

Race of Offender/Race of Victim
White
White
Nonwhite Nonwhite
Kills
Kills
Kills
Kills
White
Nonwhite
White
Nonwhite
71.6%
86.8%
58.7%
54.3%
7.7%

0.0%

13.8%

4.7%

4.5%

0.0%

8.7%

2.4%

2.8%

0.0%

2.9%

1.4%

13.4%

13.2%

15.9%

4.5%

N=426

N=38

N=138

N=572

Row
Totals
916
(78.0%)
79
(6.7%)
45
(3.8%)
24
(2.0%)
110
(9.4%)
1,174
(100.0%)

Number of Missing Observations: 0
Imposition of controls for the second most frequently alleged
aggravating element - creating a grave risk of death to someone
other than the victim during the killing - produces a different picture than that set forth in Table 16. Table 17 presents the crosstabulation of the constructed variable based on this aggravating circumstance and race of offender/race of victim categories.
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TABLE 17.

Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Allegation and Proof of Creation of a Grave Risk of Death to Someone
Other Than the Victim, and Race of Offender/Race of Victim
Race of Offender/Race of Victim
Creating
White
White
Nonwhite
Nonwhite
Row
Grave Risk
Kills
Kills
Kills
Kills
Totals
of Death
White
Nonwhite
White
Nonwhite
Not Alleged
88.7%
92.1%
77.5%
88.1%
1,024
(87.2%)

Alleged,

2.3%

5.3%

4.3%

2.6%

Proven, Death

Alleged,

1.6%

0.0%

2.9%

1.9%

Proven, Life

Alleged, Not

Column
Totals

22
(1.9%)

2.1%

0.0%

7.2%

1.9%

Proven, Death

Alleged, Not
Proven, Life

33
(2.8%)

30
(2.6%)

5.2%

2.6%

8.0%

5.4%

N=426

N=38

N= 138

N=572

65
(5.5%)

1,174
(100.0%)

Number of Missing Observations: 0
Row two of the above Table shows meaningful differences in the
rate of death sentencing between racial categories only when the
prosecutor alleges and proves the creation of this "grave risk of
death to another" during inter-racial murders. When this aggravating circumstance is proven, nonwhites who kill whites are sentenced
to death at a 4.3% rate. When whites murder nonwhites and the
prosecution proves this element of exacerbation, there is a 5.3 % likelihood of a death sentence. Capital sentences for intra-racial killings
are virtually identical (2.3 % and 2.6 %). The unexplained disparities
in death sentencing have now been moved to the second-to-last row,
i.e., cases in which the prosecution alleged, but failed to prove, the
"grave risk" aggravation and nevertheless obtained a death sentence
(by definition, through allegation and proof of some other aggravating element). Perhaps the discrepancies noted above on proof of the
"simultaneous felony" aggravating circumstance account for these
latter differences. Finally, it should again be noted that all the cases
examined comprise the entire population of interest. Questions of the
possible nonrepresentativesness of the sample, and thus use of statistical significance tests, are, therefore, not relevant.
Using as a control the third most frequently alleged aggravating
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element, a defendant's history of prior convictions for violent felonies, yields a third framework of relationships. Here, significant differences in rates of death sentencing appear to be more a function of
the race of the offender than of interactions between race of offender
and race of victim. Table 18 presents this cross-tabulation.
Of greatest significance is the dissimilarity between white and
nonwhite convictees in the percentages of cases in which the prosecutor had even alleged the presence of this aggravating circumstance.
Among the 464 white killers, only 33 (7.11 %) were charged with
this exacerbating element. In contrast, 92 (12.96%) of the 710 nonwhite murderers had this additional element lodged against them at
their sentencing hearings. Further, when this aggravating circumstance was both alleged and proven, the rate of death sentencing for
nonwhite offenders was at or near 4.0 % - regardless of whether the
victim was nonwhite or white - while the percentage of white killers sentenced to death was virtually zero. Just two of 38 whites who
killed nonwhites were charged by the prosecutor with this aggravating element, but 25 of the 138 (18.1 %) nonwhites who killed whites
were alleged to have done so.
The rates of capital sentencing for both white and nonwhite killers, however, differ little as a function of the dichotomized racial
identification of their victim. Clearly, either because of distinct differences in criminal histories as a function of race - a highly unlikely possibility - or because of a lingering racial bias, this "violent
felony history" aggravating circumstance appears to be a significant
factor in death sentencing decisions for minorities, but not in the
decision to sentence white killers to death.
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TABLE 18.
Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Allegation and Proof of a Defendant's History of Convictions for
Violent Felonies, and Race of Offender/Race of Victim
History of
Convictions
For Violent
Felonies

Not Alleged
Alleged,
Proven, Death
Alleged,
Proven, Life
Alleged, Not
Proven, Death
Alleged, Not
Proven, Life
Column
Totals

Race of Offender Race of Victim
White
White
Nonwhite
Nonwhite
Kills
Kills
Kills
Kills
White
Nonwhite
White
Nonwhite

92.7%

94.7%

81.9%

88.3%

1.4%

0.0%

4.3%

4.0%

0.5%

0.0%

0.0%

1.0%

2.3%

5.3%

9.4%

1.9%

3.1%

0.0%

4.3%

4.7%

N=426

N=38

N=138

N=572

Row
Totals

1,049
(89.4%)
35
(3.0%)
45
(3.8%)
36
(3.1%)
46
(3.9%)
1,174
(100.0%)

Number of Missing Observations: 0
The fourth most commonly alleged aggravating element, killing
by torture, shows a unique pattern when cross-tabulated with categories of offender-victim racial identification. Table 19 presents the results of this analysis.
When the prosecution has both alleged and proven killing by
torture, whites convicted of killing nonwhites are virtually twice as
likely to be sentenced to death (5.3 %) as any other offender-victim
racial pattern. This finding differs dramatically from the general
finding in the Baldus study (which had no controls for torture) that
the lowest rate of death sentencing in Georgia occurred when a
white killed a nonwhite. Thus, at least in Georgia, a white who killed
a nonwhite, no matter what the means of causing death, would have
the lowest risk of capital punishment rather than the highest. Our
Pennsylvania data suggest either that Pennsylvania and Georgia are
significantly different in race of victim/race of offender effects on the
likelihood of imposition of the death sentence, or that imposition of
controls on the Georgia data for killing by torture might produce a
similar result.
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TABLE 19.
Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Allegation and Proof of Murder by Torture and Race of Offender/Race of
Victim
Murder by
Torture
Not Alleged

Race of Offender Race of Victim
White
White
Nonwhite
Nonwhite
Kills
Kills
Kills
Kills
White
Nonwhite
White
Nonwhite
89.7%
92.1%
90.6%
94.1%

Row
Totals
1,080
(92.0%)

Alleged,
Proven, Death
Alleged,
Proven, Life
Alleged, Not
Proven, Death
Alleged, Not
Proven, Life
Column
Totals

2.8%

5.3%

2.9%

2.4%

0.5%

2.6%

0.0%

1.0%

3.1%

0.0%

0.0%

1.0%

1.4%

0.0%

6.5%

23.5%

N=426

N=38

N=138

N-572

32
(2.7%)
9
(0.8%)
19
(1.6%)
34
(2.9%)
1,174
(100.0%)

Number of Missing Observations: 0

In Pennsylvania the rates of capital sentencing are almost the
same (2.8%, 2.9%, and 2.4%) for the three other victim-offender
models. Finally, the rate of prosecutorial allegation of this specific
aggravating circumstance is highest for whites killing whites (44 of
426 cases, or 10.3%) and second lowest for whites killing nonwhites
(7.9%). The predominant influence of race of the offender over racial interaction effects is demonstrated in Table 19 above, although
the impact of this aggravating element appears to fall disproportionately on white murderers. Once again, a caveat exists in that our
data do not allow us to determine whether or not a particular aggravating circumstance, e.g., torture in this case, is unequally distributed in the setting of different murders as a function of the racial
identification of the offender.
The remaining six aggravating elements that are frequently employed by the prosecution exhibit patterns similar to one of those
described in Tables 16 through 19 above. Aggravating circumstance
number five, as set out in Table 13 above - prior convictions for
federal or state life imprisonment offenses - manifests essentially
the same pattern as does aggravating element number two, "grave
risk to another." Inter-racial killings show higher percentages of
death sentencing than do intra-racial murders. In both areas, after
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imposition of controls for these six remaining aggravating elements,
minority offenders have a greater risk of being sentenced to death
than do whites. The patterns for aggravating circumstance six (a
prior first-degree murder conviction) and seven (the victim was a
witness for the prosecution in another proceeding against the defendant) are similar to the configuration described in Table 18 above.
Differential rates of capital sentencing are more a function of the
race of the offender than of race of offender/race of victim interaction effects, although the racial differences in these latter two aggravating circumstances are smaller than they are for aggravating circumstance number three. Finally, the last three commonly alleged
aggravating elements show patterns which are variations on this
same theme. Differences in capital sentencing rates when the relevant aggravating circumstance has been alleged and proven are explained more by race of the offender than by interaction effects.
However, when the defendant is the payor for a killing (number 8)
and when the victim is a peace officer (number 10), whites are almost exclusively those sentenced to die. But when the defendant is
the payee for the murder, nonwhites are the exclusive recipients of
the death penalty.
H. Aggravating Circumstances and the Effects of Gender
As noted above, only one woman among 45 females convicted of
first-degree murder has been sentenced to death over the twelve-year
period examined herein. Therefore, imposition of controls for aggravating circumstances will have little explanatory value in the analysis
of the distribution of the death sentence. They can be helpful, however, in explaining differences in death sentence rates for males who
kill females as opposed to males who are convicted of murdering
other males.
One dominant pattern -

with several notable exceptions

-

emerges from this aspect of the analysis. Allegation and proof of one
of the ten most common aggravating elements results in a capital
sentence for men who murder women at a rate of 50% to 100%
higher than the percentage of death sentences for men convicted of
killing other males. Aggravating elements, including contemporaneous commission of a violent felony, creation of a grave risk of harm
to another, prior federal or state convictions of violent crimes, earlier
conviction(s) of first degree murder, status of the victim as a prosecution witness, the defendant as the payor for murder, his status as
the payee for the commission of a murder, and the aggravating ele-
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ment of the victim being a peace officer, all fall into this same general configuration.
Two exceptions to this basic pattern were identified. First, when
the prosecution alleges and proves that the defendant has a history
of convictions for violent felonies, the pattern inverts. In this instance, males who murder other males have about a one-third
greater risk of being sentenced to death (3.4%) than do men who
kill women (2.5 %). Finally, when the prosecution alleges and proves
that the murder was accomplished by torture, men who torture-murder female victims have nearly a two-and-one-half times greater risk
of being sentenced to death (5.0%) than do males who torture-murder other males (1.9%).
I.

Aggravating Circumstances and the Effects of Urbanization

The extent of a jurisdiction's urbanization was shown to be related to aggregate level patterns in the application of the death penalty. Imposition of controls for the ten most frequently used aggravating circumstances refines that analysis. This assessment identified
three patterns of allegation and proof of aggravating circumstances
as a consequence of imposing controls for degree of county
urbanization.
Initially, a configuration was found with only the most frequently alleged and proven aggravating circumstance - contemporaneous commission of another felony. This pattern is set out below
in Table 20.
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TABLE 20.

Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Allegation and Proof of Commission of Contemporaneous Felony,
Sentencing Outcome, and Degree of Urbanization
Urbanization
History
All
Mainly Mixed Mainly
All
Row
Convictions
Rural
Rural
Urban Urban
Totals
For Violent
Felonies

Not Alleged

65.0%

16.7%
1

Alleged,

0.0%

69.3%

65.9%

85.0%

12.3%

5.0%

3.8%

10.7%

Alleged,

79
(6.7%)

Proven, Death
Proven, Life
Alleged, Not
Proven, Death
Alleged, Not
Proven, Life
Column
Totals

916

_(78.0%)

0.0%

3.8%

6.0%

8.4%

2.4%

8.3%

1.3%

1.3%

4.5%

1.6%

75.0%

26.3%

12.7%

8.9%

6.0%

N=12

N=80

N=150

N=179

N=753

45
(3.8%)
24
(2.0%)
110
(9.4%)
1,174
(100.0%)

The data structure shows a broad but generally unsuccessful use
of the "contemporaneous commission of a felony" aggravating circumstance. The greatest rate of allegation (8.3 %) - and the greatest rate of failure of proof (75.0%) - of this aggravating element
occurs in "All Rural" counties. Success, as measured by the percentage of cases in which an allegation of an aggravating circumstance is
found to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and which
results in a death sentence against the defendant, rises as the extent
of urbanization increases until the "Mainly Urban" category is
reached. The success rate then declines dramatically in the counties
classified as "All Urban." In contrast, the proportion of failures of
proof of this allegation is greatest in the most rural jurisdictions. The
final row of Table 20 shows a consistent decline in one measure of
failure - an insufficiency of proof with a sentence of life imprisonment returned against the defendant - as the degree of urbanization of the county in which the trial is held increases. Additionally,
the extent of allegation of the "contemporaneous commission of a
felony" aggravating circumstance declines sharply as the extent of
urbanization increases. In jurisdictions classified as "All Rural," the
"contemporaneous felony" aggravation is alleged by the prosecution
at the sentencing hearing in 8.3 % of the first-degree murder convic-
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tions that they obtain. But in counties categorized as "All Urban,"
this aggravating circumstance is presented in just 5.0 % of the cases.
TABLE 21.

Pennsylvania First-degree Murder Convictions: 1978-1989
Allegation-and Proof of Creation of a Grave Risk of Death to Someone
Other Than the Victim, and Degree of Urbanization
Creating a
Grave Risk of
Death to
Another
Not Alleged

All
Rural

Urbanization
Mainly Mixed
Rural

91.7%

92.5%

91.3%

Mainly
Urban

All
Urban

72.6%

89.2%

Row
Totals
1,024
(87.2%)

Alleged,
Proven, Death
Alleged,
Proven, Life
Alleged, Not

0.0%

0.0%

0.7%

6.1%

2.8%

0.0%

0.0%

0.7%

3.9%

1.9%

8.3%

0.0%

1.3%

11.2%

0.9%

Proven, Death

Alleged, Not

(2.0%)

0.0%

7.5%

6.0%

6.1%

5.2%

Proven, Life

Column
Totals

33
(2.8%)
22
(1.9%)
30
65
(5.5%)

N=12

N=80 N=150 N=179 N=753

1,174
(100.0%)

Number of Missing Observations: 0
The second data distribution identified through imposition of
controls for extent of urbanization can be labeled as an "Urban Pattern." Six of the ten most commonly employed aggravating circumstances conformed to this model to a greater or lesser extent: 1) creation of a grave risk of death to another, 2) a history of convictions
for violent felonies, 3) murder committed by torture, 4) prior federal
or state convictions for life imprisonment offenses, 5) murder victim
as a prosecution witness against the defendant in another case, and
6) the defendant's receipt of payment to commit the murder. An
exemplar of the configuration shown by these aggravating circumstances under controls for degree of urbanization is presented in Table 21 above.
This "Urban Pattern" has several common components, as typified in the distribution for the aggravating element "creation of a
grave risk of death to another." Foremost among them is the near
exclusive allegation of these aggravating circumstances in the most
urbanized counties. Rural jurisdictions show little or no employment
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of the six aggravating elements that conform to this pattern. Another common characteristic is the overall low rate of success in
proving these aggravating circumstances and ultimately having a
death sentence returned against defendants. Finally, each of the six
aggravating circumstances that exhibit this pattern also shows a considerably higher rate of allegation, together with a correspondingly
greater proportion of failures, in the "Mainly Urban" category than
in any other grouping. This "Urban Pattern" of employing these six
aggravating circumstances is distinct from the other two data structures identified when controls for urbanization are imposed.
The third data arrangement that emerged from this portion of
the analysis can be labeled as a "Rural Pattern." It encompassed
three aggravating elements - 1) prior first degree murder convictions, 2) the defendant as the payor for a murder, and 3) the victim
as a peace officer. Generally, in all of these situations, little use was
made of the aggravating circumstance outside of rural areas, and the
success prosecutors had was found primarily in the "All Rural" and
"Mainly Rural" counties. The state was seldom successful in proving
its allegation in any of the above three areas, even on the infrequent
occasions when it made an attempt to do so.
V.

Conclusion

The preliminary findings from the Pennsylvania death penalty
data reported in this study suggest both empirical and legal conclusions and implications. While an aggregate distribution of death
sentences as a function of race shows virtually no difference in the
rate of death sentencing between whites and minorities, imposition of
controls for race of offender and race of victim interactions identifies
inequities in the extent to which minorities who kill whites are sentenced to death. Imposition of further controls for the most frequently used aggravating circumstances does not eliminate these discrepancies. In virtually all situations except killing by torture,
nonwhites who kill whites have the highest probability of being sentenced to death, while whites who kill nonwhites have the lowest.
The most glaring variances in rates of capital sentencing disclosed by our research are related to the gender of the offender.
Women have only a minimal risk of being sentenced to death upon
conviction for murder. When the same aggravating circumstances
are alleged and proven, males have a significant likelihood of receiving the death penalty, but females have virtually none. The minimal
risk of females receiving the death penalty persists irrespective of
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controls for race of victim and offender and for urbanization of the
county in which the crime was committed. To the extent that gender
is an immutable characteristic similar to race, age, etc., such extreme discrepancies, unrelated to the circumstances of the offense or
the nature of the offender, should be subject to the most serious
question. The logic of the McCleskey decision requires that a defendant prove actual discrimination by the trier of fact in his/her
own trial - a burden.that convicted first degree murderers have
generally not been able to carry. However, the Pennsylvania data
raise an overwhelming inference of gender-based discrimination
against men in imposition of the death sentence. To dismiss this finding in the fashion that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the findings
of the Baldus study in McCleskey, "[w]here the discretion that is
fundamental to our criminal justice process is involved, we decline to
assume that what is unexplained is invidious, ' '4 7 ignores that which is
self-evident in cases in which human lives are at stake.
The extent of urbanization of the county in which an offense
was committed also discloses interesting patterns. Most importantly,
if the data from Philadelphia are excluded, a convicted defendant's
risk of being sentenced to death increases rapidly as the extent of
urbanization of the jurisdiction in which the murder was committed
increases. Further, three clear patterns emerge in the prosecution's
use of aggravating circumstances, and their success in that effort.
The first pattern is distinguished by the allegation of the contemporaneous felony aggravating circumstance in a large percentage of the
cases. This pattern was found in most counties, regardless of the degree of urbanization. The second is an "Urban Pattern" in which six
of the ten most commonly employed aggravating circumstances grave risk of death to another, history of violent felony convictions,
murder by torture, prior convictions for life imprisonment offenses,
murder victim a prosecution witness, defendant as payee for the
murder - were quite successfully employed by urban jurisdiction
prosecutors to achieve the death penalty. Finally, a "Rural Pattern"
emerged in which three aggravating elements - prior first-degree
murder convictions, defendant as payor for murder, and a peace officer victim - were frequently, although somewhat unsuccessfully,
employed in more rural counties and were effectively ignored in urban counties.
Empirically, our analysis demonstrates that the intent of the
Pennsylvania statute is realized with respect to the intended opera47.

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987).
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tion of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The greater the
number of aggravating circumstances proven by the prosecution and
the lower the number of mitigating circumstances presented by the
defense at the sentencing hearing, the higher the likelihood that a
convicted first degree murderer will receive the death penalty in
Pennsylvania. On the other hand, evidence regarding inequities related to race of victim/race of offender interactions, gender, and degree of urbanization, point out that the statute does not eliminate the
apparent influence of these extra-legal factors in the decision to sentence the defendant to death or to life imprisonment.
The findings suggest the potential for numerous legal challenges
that may yet be made to the Pennsylvania death penalty statute.
Note that roughly two-thirds of the death penalty cases involved situations in which the jury found both aggravating and mitigating circumstances and was, therefore, required by statute to balance these
in reaching a decision at the sentencing hearing. Inasmuch as this
prong of the statute does not require the counting of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in deciding between death and life, it is
possible that the jury would sentence a defendant to death when it
finds one aggravating and two mitigating circumstances but chooses
to weigh the one aggravating factor much more heavily. It is precisely in this area that the extra-legal factors noted above may have
an inordinate influence in the final decision on life or death for the
defendant. Consequently, the arbitrariness that led the Supreme
Court to strike Furman-type death penalty statutes appears simply
to have been renamed and relocated in the Pennsylvania statute and
others similar to it. The key to the Furman objection was the absence of guidelines to restrain the jury's exercise of discretion to impose a death or life sentence. However, the same absence of guidelines is present in the Pennsylvania cases in which juries found at
least one aggravating circumstance and one or more mitigating circumstances. In these cases - nearly two-thirds of the total - the
jury had, in effect, precisely the same freedom to impose life or
death that was found to be so objectionable in Furman. Further, our
findings on the effects of race, gender, and urbanization indicate
strongly that the Furman problem has not been eliminated. As noted
above, an argument to the contrary may also find some support in
our analysis indicating that juries have in fact weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances somewhat "rationally" in terms of
imposing the death penalty most frequently when the prosecution alleges multiple aggravating circumstances while the defense offers

DEATH SENTENCE IN PENNSYLVANIA

few mitigating circumstances.
Pennsylvania's implementation of comparative proportionality
review was designed to prevent the capricious and discriminatory imposition of the death penalty. Comparative proportionality review
has made the state's death penalty more legally legitimate by helping to promote its evenhanded application. As the findings of this
empirical research reveal, while the present comparative proportionality review utilized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is meeting
its goals in some respects, it fails to eliminate discrimination in other
important respects and, therefore, has failed to provide a comprehensive principled and effective means for the appellate review of death
sentences.
Since 1978 Pennsylvania has required the state supreme court
to conduct a comprehensive proportionality review of every death
sentence imposed by a jury to ensure that the sentence comports
with federal and state protections against cruel and unusual punishment. 48 Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits the imposition of cruel punishment. 9 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that when a trial lacks fundamental fairness
and results in the death penalty, the punishment violates Article 1,
section 13.50 In applying this provision of the state constitution, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court could require the appellate review procedure to be nondiscriminatory and nonarbitrary in its application,
even though the U.S. Supreme Court has not required such a determination to be made under the federal constitution."1 Indeed, if
Pennsylvania's comparative proportionality review has been at least
partially discriminatorily applied, the court could refuse to sustain
the constitutionality of the current review procedure and find that
the present form of comparative proportionality review violates
Pennsylvania's constitutional prohibition against cruel punishment.52
48. Act of Sept. 15, 1978, Pub. L. 746, No. 141, (codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
9711 (1978)). Pennsylvania's capital punishment statute is designed to limit the arbitrary use
of the death sentence, both at the trial and appellate levels.
49. PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 13 ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines

imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted."). The Pennsylvania position differs from the eighth
amendment of the federal constitution, which states that "(e]xcessive bail shall not be re-

quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. VIII.
50. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), cert. denied, 461

U.S. 970 (1983).
51. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43 (1984).
52. See Hartman, Critiquing Pennsylvania's Comparative Porportionality Review in
Capital Cases, 52 PITT. L. REv. 871 (1991), for a detailed discussion and development of this
thesis.

